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many objects of consciousness not only do not evoke the endur-
ing state of a belief; they do not even evoke a momentary act of
judgment. We are not sufficiently aware of them for them to do
that.19 So consider those of which we are sufficiently aware for
them to evoke beliefs about themselves. Was it Reid s view that in
such cases we have conceptually unmediated acquaintance with
those mental states and acts?
Before answering, let s notice that Reid s understanding of the
relation of concepts to those mental states and acts is very differ-
ent from Kant s understanding. For the situation, as Reid sees it,
is not that we are confronted with a manifold of intuition whose
ontological status is that this is how noumenal reality puts in its
appearance to us qua noumenal, and that we then organize this
manifold by the imposition of concepts. The situation is rather
that we are confronted with genuinely real entities that aren t
appearances of anything at all mental states and acts that aren t
appearances of something else and that have their own identity
and character quite independent of our conceptual activity. Dis-
tinct mental entities are not the product of our conceptualizing
activity; the situation is rather that we are acquainted with mental
entities under concepts.
But what is it to be acquainted with some mental state under
the concept, say of my dizziness? It is to be acquainted with it as
my dizziness. And what, in turn, is that? I think it eminently clear
what Reid would say: To be acquainted with it as dizziness is for
one s acquaintance with it to evoke in one the belief, about it, that
it is a case of dizziness. To be acquainted with something under
the concept of a K is for one s acquaintance to evoke in one the
belief, about the object of the acquaintance, that it is a K.
Consider, then, those acts of consciousness of which one is suf-
ficiently aware for them to evoke in one beliefs about their
objects: Our acquaintance with those acts is thereby acquaintance
under concepts. But this acquaintance under concepts does not
consist of structuring these acts conceptually, for they are already
structured; it consists, to say it again, of one s acquaintance with
those acts evoking in one de re/predicative beliefs about them-
selves, the predicative component of which is then the concept.
19
Admittedly this interpretation flies in the face of passages like this: In persons come
to years of understanding, judgment necessarily accompanies all sensation, perception
by the senses, consciousness, and memory, but not conception (EIP VI, i [414a b]).
An Exception (or Two) to Reid s Standard Schema 159
From this it obviously does not follow that we are not after all
acquainted with those mental acts that they are not present to
us. What follows is rather just what was said: We are acquainted
with them under concepts.
A theme running through John McDowell s recent book, Mind
and World,20 is that the reason experience can be caught up into
the space of beliefs and of reasons for beliefs is that experience
is conceptualized. Reid would agree. The reason he would agree,
however, is that he would deny that there is any space between
being acquainted with something under some concept and
having a belief about that entity; to be acquainted with something
under some concept just is for one s acquaintance to evoke a de
re/predicative belief about that entity.21
When it comes to those modes of perception that satisfy the
standard schema, our conclusion was that Reid does not think
that we have acquaintance with the entity perceived; our appre-
hension of the entity is rather conceptual apprehension. A sen-
sation evoked by the perceived object evokes a conceptual
apprehension of that object, along with a belief, about it, that it
exists as an external object (or a belief which entails that). In case
I do not already have the concepts requisite for that apprehen-
sion and belief, the sensation also evokes those concepts. Thus it
is that we gain information about the world which outstrips the
information gained from beliefs about objects of acquaintance
and from what can be inferred from those.
So suppose I apprehend what I perceive with some such
concept as the computer which I see; and suppose someone from
some tribal society apprehends it with some such concept as
the mysterious gray box which I see. What s incoherent about saying
that we see the very same thing, and that our two different ways
of conceptualizing it are both correct? I perceive it as a computer;
he perceives it as a mysterious box. It s both of those. Where s the
problem?
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