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certain steps on our part. somehow rectifying the situation in the economy. ence on the formation of the leading organs of the
Despite this it is obvious to everyone that the party. They, apparently, are trying to achieve
1. To approve the ideas put forth in the note lull following the session of the Sejm is ephem- conspicuous changes in the PZPR leadership
of the CPSU CC Politburo Commission on the eral. The opponent has gone along with it purely even as soon as the PZPR CC plenum.
Polish question (see attached). out of tactical considerations, while continuing to The left flank is represented by such Com-
2. To affirm a plan of measures to lend mount his forces for the infliction of new strikes munists as Grabski, Zabinski, Olszowski,
assistance to the PZPR leadership in the organi- against the party. Kociolek, and others. The positions adopted by
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 131
these comrades in the ideological sphere are decisive actions to overcome the crisis and pre- additional measures to assist the PZPR leader-
closest to our own. They express the sentiments serve Poland as a socialist country friendly to the ship in strengthening the party both organization-
of the members of the party who consistently Soviet Union. ally and ideologically.
support socialism and friendship with the Soviet Strongly recommend to our friends that in
Union, and who oppose revisionist excesses and the first instance they must achieve unity and K. Chernenko
demand resolute action against Solidarity. stability in the leadership of the PZPR, defending Yu. Andropov
Overall they are backed by the old members of the comrades who have become the main targets A. Gromyko
the party, who were brought up in the school of of attack by the opposition and by the enemies of D. Ustinov
war and in the class struggle that marked the first socialism (Grabski, Zabinski, Olszowski, K. Rusakov
stages of the establishment of People s Poland. Kociolek, et al.). In turn, help these comrades I. Arkhipov
Unfortunately, representatives of this point recognize the necessity of supporting Comrades L. Zamyatin
of view are now far from a majority. One gets the Kania and Jaruzelski, of behaving more flexibly,
impression that they believe the solution to the and of not openly opposing slogans of socialist 16 April 1981
crisis will come only through a frontal attack on renewal. It is important that they strike at the
Solidarity, without taking account of the cur- enemies of socialism without implying that Soli- ______________________________________
rent correlation of forces. In espousing this view, darity as a whole is identical to the hostile forces
they do not believe there is a possibility of that exist within the organization. Regarding point VII of Prot. No. 7
rectifying the situation without the introduction Direct the attention of Polish leaders to
of Soviet troops. Such a position is objectively the necessity of carefully preparing for the IX Top Secret
leading them to become more and more isolated PZPR Congress. Get them to struggle for an
in both the party and the country. Substantial ample contingent of healthy forces at the Con- SET OF MEASURES TO ASSIST THE PZPR
efforts will be required (if indeed they are still gress and to take an active role in this regard with LEADERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL
possible) to get them elected to the Congress and the party organizations of large state enterprises. AND IDEOLOGICAL STRENGTHENING
have them join the leading organs. Recommend to the Polish comrades that OF THE PARTY
In effect, Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski they bind Solidarity in every way possible to
occupy a centrist position. In the difficult situa- the resolution of productive matters, while limit- Dispatch a working group from the CPSU
tion that emerged after August of last year, they ing its political activity. To this end, they should CC Department for Organizational-Party Work
turned out to be proponents of the sentiments that accelerate the adoption of laws on economic to the PPR in May and June 1981 for consulta-
gained sway in the party and the country in favor reform and trade unions. tions on matters concerning preparations for the
of resolving the ongoing acute problems by means Actively exploit the discernible fragmen- Extraordinary IX Congress of the PZPR.
of dialogue and an agreement with Solidarity. tation among the leaders of Solidarity, disrupt The CPSU CC Department, and the depart-
The subsequent period showed that Kania and the anti-socialist and anti-national activity of ments for organizational-party work, propaganda,
Jaruzelski, while referring to the necessity of KOS-KOR and its leaders, and bring about the and foreign policy propaganda of the CPSU CC,
protecting the gains of socialism in Poland, pur- isolation of these counterrevolutionaries. Adopt are to analyze the draft theses for the PZPR
sued this course passively and hesitantly, mak- decisive measures against attempts to stir up a Congress, the draft PZPR statutes, and the drafts
ing numerous concessions in favor of Solidar- wave of anti-Sovietism in the country. of other documents, as well as the status of
ity. They have displayed insufficient firmness Induce the Polish leadership to maintain organizational preparations for the Congress, and
and steadfastness in the struggle against the constant watch over the state of the army and should relay appropriate recommendations to the
counterrevolutionary forces. In their view, de- Internal Affairs Ministry organs, including their CPSU CC.
votion to socialism is compatible with the na- morale, political stability, and readiness to fulfill Receive a delegation from the PZPR CC
tionalist idea that was circulated during Gierek s their duty in defense of socialism. It is essential Organizational Department in April-May 1981,
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