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one-outside-another, as, therefore, empty space and empty time, are only subjective forms, a pure act of
intuition; so is that pure being (which, through the supersession in it of the particularity of the corporeity, or
of the immediate corporeity as such, has realized itself) mere intuition and no more, lacking consciousness,
but the basis of consciousness. And consciousness it becomes, when the corporcity, of which it is the
subjective substance, and which still continues to exist, and that as a barrier for it, has been absorbed by it,
and it has been invested with the character of self-centred subject.
¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being, and reducing the particulars of feelings (and of
consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habit. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession,
and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient, nor does it stand in relationship
with them as distinguishing itself from them, nor is absorbed in them, but has them and moves in them,
without feeling or consciousness of the fact. The soul is freed from them, so far as it is not interested in or
occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession, it is at the same time open to be
otherwise occupied and engaged - say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general.
SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE 15
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul
appears as a repetition of them, and the generation of habit as practice. For, this being of the soul, if in respect
of the natural particular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is transmuted, is a
reflexive universality (¤ 175); i.e. the one and the same, that recurs in a series of units of sensation, is reduced
to unity, and this abstract unity expressly stated.
Habit like memory, is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mechanism of self-feeling, as
memory is the mechanism of intelligence. The natural qualities and alterations of age, sleep, and waking are
'immediately' natural: habit, on the contrary, is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence, will, etc., so far as
they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical existence. Habit is rightly called a second
nature; nature, because it is an immediate being of the soul; a second nature, because it is an immediacy
created by the soul, impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such
and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401).
In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural', and for that reason not free; but still free, so far as
the merely natural phase of feeling is by habit reduced to a mere being of his, and he is no longer
involuntarily attracted or repelled by it, and so no longer interested, occupied, or dependent in regard to it.
The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal, as habit merely attaches to the being of the soul; partly
only relative, so far as it strictly speaking arises only in the case of bad habits, or so far as a habit is opposed
by another purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of liberty. The main point
about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from the feelings, even in being affected by them. The
different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as
indifferent. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost, heat, weariness of the limbs, etc., sweet
tastes, etc.), and who hardens the heart against misfortune, acquires a strength which consists in this, that
although the frost, etc. - or the misfortune - is felt, the affection is deposed to a mere externality and
immediacy; the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it, and the self-feeling as
such, consciousness, reflection, and any other purposes and activity, are no longer bothered with it. (b) There
is indifference towards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisfaction
deadened. This is the rational liberation from them; whereas monastic renunciation and forcible interference
do not free from them, nor are they in conception rational. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses
are kept as the finite modes they naturally are, and that they, like their satisfaction, are subordinated as partial
factors to the reasonable will. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude, or skill, not merely has the abstract psychical
life to be kept intact per se, but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim, to be made a power in the bodily
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